

NEbraskaCERT Cyber Security Forum

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Security Assessment Methodologies

Stephen M. Nugen, CISSP

- Steve Nugen

- Affiliations: CISSP, NEbraskaCERT, NuGenSoft, CSM, InfraGard, etc.

- Contact
 - smnugen@nugensoft.com
 - 402.505.7691

- Style: Talks too fast, mumbles; but never offended if asked to slow down or repeat something

- Includes
 - Security assessment methodology topics
 - Content from multiple sources, selected and modified according to presenter's prejudices
 - Presenter's own methods

- Structure
 - Part-1: Context: Terms, etc.
 - Part-2: Methodology
 - Part-3: Some discovery activities (time permitting)

Part-1: Terms and definitions

- Different experts use different terms
 - Some attempts being made to distinguish between them, common understandings still evolving
 - A snapshot...

- Penetration Tests
 - Aka Penetration Analysis, Pen Test, Ethical Hacking, White Hat Hacking, Red Team, Tiger Team
 - Test team plays role of hostile external attacker
 - Done externally to the organization using public Internet connections
 - Probe networks and devices to identify vulnerabilities that could be remotely exploited

- Penetration Tests cont'd
 - Oftentimes covert
 - Management authorized
 - No notification to IT staff...
 - Zero knowledge (no inside knowledge, no support)
 - May include testing the organization's capability to detect and react to penetration activities
 - May include social engineering
 - May not be comprehensive
 - Like attacker, only need to find one good vulnerability
 - Sometimes a vivid wake-up call for management

■ Audits

- Independent team
- Overt
 - Coordinated with organization
 - Full-knowledge and organizational support, including interviews
- Mostly internal
- Measure current practices/implementations against some set of standards
 - External standards defined by government, business partners, etc.
 - Organization's own policies and procedures
- May include an evaluation of the standards themselves
- May include physical security

■ Assessments

- Aka security diagnostic
- Internal or external team
- Test team assumes multiple roles, including insiders
- Overt
 - Full cooperation of organization, participation as required
 - Full-knowledge, including sensitive knowledge (network diagrams, etc.)
- External and internal access
- More comprehensive than penetration tests
 - Goal is to find all the most-critical vulnerabilities so that the associated risk can be managed

■ Formal verifications

– Ideal

- Complete and convincing mathematical argument that proves the absence of vulnerabilities
- Preconditions specify constraints on the system state when software executes
- Postconditions specify the effect of executing the software

– Trusted product verification

- Compares two levels of system specification for proper correspondence
 - Ex: Security policy model to top-level specification
 - Ex: Top-level specification to source code
 - Ex: Source code to object code

- Common practice: Combinations, tailored to organizational requirements

- Part of the security process
 - Between awareness and countermeasures
 - Periodic evaluations in a changing environment
 - Changing assets
 - Changing threats

- Component of risk management
 - Identification
 - Analysis (likelihood of compromise, cost of compromise)
 - Mitigation
 - Informed acceptance


■ Goals

- Avoid the consequences of misuse/compromise
 - Discover weaknesses before they are exploited
 - Measure how well the organization resists misuse/compromise
- Discover actual performance against what the organization believes it has implemented
 - Analogy: Using an proofreader to detect mistakes not visible to the author
 - Universal finding: Discovering protocols, services, etc. that were not thought present by Exec/IT management
 - Common finding: Key restrictions not enforced or monitored by technical means

- Goals cont'd
 - Evaluate the actual system for compliance with plans, policies, etc. defined by the organization or others (audit)
 - Use a methodology/process which is repeatable, supporting
 - Validation, confidence
 - Re-use


■ True Attacks

- Not constrained by need to maintain business continuity
- Success: Discovery and exploitation of any single vulnerability




■ Ethical Discovery

- Needs to discover same vulnerabilities as unconstrained malicious actor
- Constrained by need to maintain
 - Business continuity
 - Availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information and information assets
 - Good records of activities and findings



■ Ethical Discovery cont'd

- Ideal success: Discovery and remediation of every vulnerability
 - Not possible
 - Testing only proves the existence of vulnerabilities, not their absence
- Realistic success: Discovery and mitigation of most critical vulnerabilities



Part-2: Methodologies

- Some defined formally, such as
 - Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (FHM)
 - Attack Tree (AT) Methodology
 - InfoSec Assessment Methodology (IAM)

- Some defined less formally by vendors and best practices

- Development continues
 - Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
 - Others... research institutions, vendors

- Three approaches with respect to how much insider knowledge provided to test team: Zero, Partial, Full
- Zero Knowledge
 - Aka Black Box
 - Testers not given any company-private information about target networks and systems
 - Most realistic simulation of external intrusion
 - Tester not biased by security architecture
 - Requires independent testers
 - Takes longer, costs more

- Full Knowledge
 - Aka Crystal box
 - Testers provided with network diagrams, system configurations, etc.
 - Simulates internal attacks
 - Quicker, costs less
 - Coordinated tests less likely to harm system
 - Testers can be employees or independent

- Partial Knowledge
 - More than zero, less than full...

■ Overview

- System analysis and penetration techniques
- Specifications and documentation for the system are analyzed
- Flaws in the system are hypothesized
- Hypothesized flaws prioritized based on
 - Probability that flaw actually exists
 - Ease and impact of exploiting the flaw
- Prioritized list used to direct penetration attack

- IAM: InfoSec Assessment Methodology
- Developed by NSA in response to PDD-63
- Phased approach
 - Pre-Assessment
 - On-Site Visit
 - Post-Assessment

- Addresses 18 areas

- InfoSec Documentation
- Identification/Authentication
- Session Controls
- Telecommunications
- Virus Protection
- Maintenance
- Back-ups
- Media Sanitation/Disposal
- Personnel Security
- Roles and Responsibilities
- Account Management
- External Connectivity
- Auditing
- Contingency Planning
- Configuration Management
- Labeling
- Physical Environment
- Training and Awareness

- Training...

■ Context

- OCTAVE: Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation
- Developed by SEI (Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University)
- Funded by
 - U.S. Department of Defense
 - U.S. Department of State
- Two flavors
 - OCTAVE: For large-scale organizations
 - OCTAVE-S: For small organizations (still under development)
- Src: CERT (www.cert.org)

■ Motivation

– Observed deficiencies in evaluations

- Technology-only focused
- Conducted without site's direct participation
- Precipitated by an event (reactive rather than proactive)
- Using undefined or inconsistent criteria

– Need

- Expand the organizational involvement beyond IT
- Include security policies, practices, procedures
- Be proactive rather than reactive
- Provide a foundation for continuous security improvement


■ Philosophy

- Cannot mitigate all risks... cannot prevent all determined, skilled incursions
- Budget and other resources limited
- So, need to focus limited resources on ensuring the survivability of the enterprise

■ Approach

- Uses organization's own expertise and resources, not outsourced
 - Organization self-directs the assessment
- Full-knowledge
- Uses a workshop-based approach for gathering information and making decisions
 - At least 12 workshops, each a half or full-day
 - Durations vary from few weeks to more than 6-months depending on scope and scheduling complications
- Organizations tailor the OCTAVE approach to their own needs

■ Phases (graphic)



■ Phases cont'd

– Preparation

- Senior management sponsorship
- Selecting team members
- Training
- Planning: scope, etc.

– Phase-1: Organizational view

- Identify organization's self-knowledge of its assets in terms of
 - Criticality
 - Threats
 - Security requirements
 - What organization is currently doing to protect those assets
- Includes senior management, operational area, and staff knowledge
- Build asset-based threat profiles

■ Phases cont'd

– Phase-2: Technological View

- Identify key components of shared information infrastructure
- Evaluate key components for technology vulnerabilities that could be exploited

– Phase-3: Strategy and Plan Development

- Analyze information collected/generated by Phase-1 and Phase-2
- Develop protection strategy. including
 - Organizational direction
 - Mitigation plans to reduce risk
 - Near-term actions

- Uses catalogs of information
 - Practices: collection of good practices
 - Used in Phase-1 as a benchmark to compare current practices against
 - Used in Phase-3 to develop organization's protection strategy
 - Threat Profile: range of threats organizations need to consider
 - Used at the end of Phase-1
 - Vulnerabilities: collection of vulnerabilities based on platform and application
 - Used in Phase-2
 - OCTAVE does not include tools

■ OCTAVE licensing


- Not required for internal use
- License from SEI required for external users, including
 - Individual advisors/trainers
 - Transition partners: organizations that help other organizations with OCTAVE
 - Developers of derivatives or automated tools supporting OCTAVE

- Presenter's viewpoint
 - With
 - Credit to multiple sources
 - Blame to none
 - Unconstrained by cost and schedule...

- Overall process defined by the intersection of
 - Phase (e.g., discovery, evaluation, remediation)
 - Role (outsider, associate, insider)
 - Scope (e.g., subnet-x, location-y)
 - Activity (planning, collection, analysis, reporting)

■ Phases

- Discover potential targets of misuse
 - Information
 - Information assets
- Discover vulnerabilities in those potential targets
 - Possible exploits
 - Differences in observed performance versus
 - Expected performance
 - Required/specified performance
- Evaluate vulnerabilities
 - Confirm/demonstrate the existence of vulnerability
 - May include controlled intrusions, exploits




■ Phases cont'd

– Remediation... from viewpoint of security diagnostics:

- Does include recommendations to reduce risk
- Does not include corrective measures

– After remediation, may repeat subset of Evaluation and Discovery phases to measure the effectiveness of the corrective measures




■ Roles

– Defined by access and insider knowledge

– Outsiders


- Internet access to company information and assets: Yes
- Physical access to company facilities, and networks: No
- Employee account and/or knowledge: No
- Examples
 - Anyone, anywhere, anytime
 - Script kiddies ranging from curious to malicious
 - Expert hackers motivated by recognition, hactivism, money



■ Roles cont'd

– Associates


- Internet access to company information and assets: Yes
- Physical access to company facilities, and networks: Yes
- Employee account and/or knowledge: No
- Specified by some as external intruder with physical access
- Examples
 - Outsourced cleaning, security, maintenance, service staff, etc.
 - Short-term visitors, vendors, consultants, temporary employees
 - Any outsider who has compromised any client or server inside the organization



■ Roles cont'd

– Insiders

- Internet access to company information and assets: Yes
- Physical access to company facilities, and networks: Yes
- Employee account and/or knowledge: Yes
- Examples
 - Employees... users, manager, system administrators
 - Longer-term visitors, vendors, consultants, temporary employees
 - Ex-employee with Associate access (directly or indirectly via compromised client or server)



- Scope defined by
 - Networks, subnets, domains, etc.
 - Facility locations
 - And, so forth
 - Constraints
 - Ex: Network infrastructure only
 - Ex: No Web Applications
 - Ex: No Denial of Service

- Activities include

- Planning

- Rules of Engagement
 - Success criteria
 - Configuring systems and tools for
 - Collection and analysis
 - Secure storage of sensitive information
 - Research specific to organization's assets

- Data collection

- External, Internal
 - May be witnessed
 - May be scheduled outside of production

- Activities include

- Analysis

- Common: One hour of collection requires 2-6 hours of analysis

- Reporting

- Executive summary for CxO level
 - Management report for IT Directors
 - Technical report for system/network administrators

- Opinions differ...

- Commercial
 - Include technical support
 - May have lower probability of hidden harm
 - Not what hackers use
 - Costly

- Freeware (including Open Source and non-sourced freeware)
 - Useful tool may include an unknown malicious component
 - Closer match to hacker attacks
 - Free

Part-3: Some Discovery Activities

■ Overview

- Aka ROE, Rules of Behavior
- Outlines the framework for external and internal testing
- Usual goals... all of them simultaneous
 - Minimize impact to operations
 - Maximize test effectiveness (minimize cost)

■ Includes


- Identifying the scope of the assessment in terms of
 - Which networks... which systems
 - What kinds of tests... DoS for example?
 - Shared hosting environment?
- What process to use if evidence of previous attack discovered

- Includes cont'd
 - Points of contact
 - Witnesses
 - Who does testing
 - Minder/Witness/Observer
 - Criteria for success
 - How work products are secured
 - May include
 - Formal release stating testing organization will be held harmless and not not liable for unintentional
 - Disruption to operations... e.g., interruptions in service
 - Loss or damage to information and/or information resources

- Technical collection may require multiple systems

- Illustration

- Sys-A: Active
 - Multiple tools
 - Networked
 - OS not hardened
- Sys-B: Passive
 - Packet sniffer
 - Semi-networked
 - OS not hardened
- Sys-C: Secure
 - Secure storage, analysis
 - Standalone
 - OS hardened



- Done off-site using Internet

- Discover Domains
 - Identify all the domains registered-to/used-by target organization
 - For each domain, discover
 - Contact information
 - DNS servers
 - Query each DNS server to learn about
 - Related domains
 - Exposed servers/services (web, mail, etc.)

- Discover public information about the target
 - Search engines, etc.
 - What are they saying?
 - Are they disclosing too much information with respect to security?
 - What are others saying about them?
 - Identify vendors, partners, etc.
 - Who links to them?
 - What are their employees saying?
 - Are sensitive/vulnerable file types indexed by search engines?

- Discover exposed (public and dmz) subnets and devices
 - Tools include ping, traceroute, IP allocation DBs, etc.
 - IPs may be allocated to hosting provider
 - Identify perimeter routers, firewalls, DMZ servers, etc.
 - Requires caution...

- Done off-site using Internet
(or inside, but outside perimeter firewall)

- Use port scanners and related tools to characterize (fingerprint) each device
 - What operating system, version?
 - What services and applications are accessible?

- Fingerprinting includes
 - Identifying the operating system by small differences in their implementation of TCP/IP, including
 - Response to TCP control messages (RST, FIN, etc.)
 - TTL
 - Initial window size
 - And, so forth
 - Retrieving login prompts for Telnet, FTP, etc to identify the vendor, version, etc.
 - SNMP reads... using "Public" community string to identify vendors, model numbers, etc.

- Fingerprinting cont'd
 - Examining HTTP (web) servers to identify the vendor, version, tools used to generate the HTML, etc.
 - Response to HEAD and OPTIONS requests
 - Response to GET requests for specific file types
 - Meta content in returned source
 - Note: Target devices/services can tweak the information they provide to deny, frustrate, or deceive this type of discovery

■ Modems

- Aka War Dialing
- Find modems connected (even if only occasionally) to
 - Workstations, servers, network
 - PBX
 - Building controls
- May require auto-dialing range of numbers to detect rogue modems
 - May be obnoxious or even illegal in some states
 - Oftentimes done during different time periods to detect occasional-use modems
 - Normal work hours
 - Nights
 - Weekends

■ WLANs

- Aka war driving
- External/Internal activities include
 - Discover rogue access points
 - Discover access points broadcasting their SSID
 - Evaluate WLAN communication encryption, etc.
 - Susceptibility to crack?
 - Evaluate range of access points... accessible from outside the facility?
 - Evaluate connectivity between access points and LAN
 - Where are they connected in relation to firewalls and IDS?

■ Web Applications

– Scope includes

- Authentication vulnerabilities
- Active content
- Session hijacking
- Information leakage (under error conditions for example)

– External/Internal activities include

- Evaluate web server
 - Fingerprint
 - Susceptibility to vulnerabilities such as path traversal, non-standard encodings, etc.

- Web Applications cont'd
 - External/Internal activities cont'd
 - Examine source for
 - Script languages, sources
 - Hidden forms, values
 - Client-side validation
 - Authentication methods
 - Examine session management mechanisms
 - Session cookies
 - Parameters
 - Examine persistent cookies

■ Web Applications cont'd

- Optional external/internal activities
 - Preferably done on non-production testbed environment
 - Done carefully, so not to cause unintentional DoS
 - Manipulate inputs to cause client-side errors
 - Client-side validation
 - Cross-site scripting
 - And, so forth

■ Web Applications cont'd

– Optional external/internal activities cont'd

- Manipulate inputs to cause server-side errors

- May require defeating client-side checks via

- Direct GETs and POSTs

- Tester-controlled proxy

- Edit client-side source

- Watch for DoS

- Probe for meaningful error codes

- Evaluate potential for SQL injection

- Examine session management

- Can use in-line proxy to manipulate session cookies, parameters, etc.

- Done on-site with LAN connection (or externally via VPN tunnel)

- Degree of logical access depends on the role
 - Associate: No account
 - Insider: Accounts typical of different classes of insiders

■ Internal Infrastructure

- Tools and activities: Similar to external discovery
- Additional activities include
 - Evaluating physical access to restricted areas
 - Fingerprint DMZ servers from inside
 - Test outbound firewall/router rules
 - Test extranets to connected partners
 - Searching all subnets via ping sweeps, etc.
 - Testing router configurations, including
 - Passwords
 - Services
 - And, so forth

- Internal Infrastructure cont'd
 - Additional activities cont'd
 - Packet sniffing
 - if switched, use
 - Uplink port
 - ARP poisoning
 - Identify key servers
 - Identify workstations acting as servers
 - Common findings
 - Privacy concerns
 - Unexpected (by organization staff) traffic
 - Protocols
 - Destinations
 - Servers

- Windows domains
 - Tools include MS resource kits, etc.
 - Map domains and trust relationships
 - Identify devices not in IT-controlled domains as potential targets
 - Default WORKGROUP
 - Special-purpose... marketing, building controls, etc.

■ Hosts (Server/Workstations)

– Tools include

- Port scanners, enumerators, etc.
- Patch-level analyzers
- Host-level analyzers, templates
- Checklists...

– Evaluation areas include

- Evaluating OS configuration (hardening)
 - Security settings for anonymous access, etc.
 - Exposed services, shares, etc.
 - Authentication policies
 - Access permissions
 - Installed utilities, applications, etc.

■ Hosts cont'd

– Evaluation areas cont'd

- Browser and email client configurations
 - Proxies
 - Preview panes
 - Scripting, etc.
- Audit configuration
 - How are the logs configured
 - Which events logged
 - Which resources monitored
- Installed versus needed patches... for OS, Browser, Server Apps, Client Apps, etc.

■ Hosts cont'd

– Evaluation areas cont'd

- User accounts

- Dummy Administrator

- Administrators

- Shared local administrator

- Local and domain accounts with administrator rights

- Other... particularly shared accounts where the password is likely to be simple

- Comments that may identify the password


- Note: Password cracking may done during this activity, or as part of off-site analysis

- Vulnerability Discovery

- Define (hypothesize) probable vulnerabilities, focusing on the most critical
- Evaluate...

- Remediation

- Re-test



Questions

Comments

Contributions